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Abstract One of the reasons why moral enhancement
may be controversial, is because the advantages of mor-
al enhancement may fall upon society rather than on
those who are enhanced. If directed at individuals with
certain counter-moral traits it may have direct societal
benefits by lowering immoral behavior and in-
creasing public safety, but it is not directly clear
if this also benefits the individual in question. In
this paper, we will discuss what we consider to be
moral enhancement, how different means may be
used to achieve it and whether the means we
employ to reach moral enhancement matter moral-
ly. Are certain means to achieve moral enhance-
ment wrong in themselves? Are certain means to
achieve moral enhancement better than others, and
if so, why? More specifically, we will investigate
whether the difference between direct and indirect
moral enhancement matters morally. Is it the case
that indirect means are morally preferable to direct
means of moral enhancement and can we indeed
pinpoint relevant intrinsic, moral differences be-
tween both? We argue that the distinction between
direct and indirect means is indeed morally rele-
vant, but only insofar as it tracks an underlying
distinction between active and passive interven-
tions. Although passive interventions can be ethi-
cal provided specific safeguards are put in place,
these interventions exhibit a greater potential to
compromise autonomy and disrupt identity.
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Introduction
An enhancement can be broadly defined as any
Bdeliberate intervention … which aims to improve
an existing capacity that most or all human beings
typically have, or to create a new capacity^ [1:
23]. When these interventions are biomedical or
biotechnological in nature and act directly on the
body or brain, we can speak of biomedical en-
hancement. In this article we focus on moral en-
hancement, because this is a relatively new and
controversial concept. Moral enhancement is more
complex compared to most forms of (cognitive)
enhancement, in which typically one more-or-less
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isolated trait is targeted, and attitudes towards
moral enhancement appear to be more varied.1
One of the reasons it is controversial, is because
the advantages of moral enhancement may fall
upon society rather than on those who are en-
hanced. If directed at individuals with certain
counter-moral traits it may have direct societal
benefits by lowering immoral behavior and in-
creasing public safety, but it is not directly clear
if this also benefits the individual in question.
Finally, the risk of abuse seems greater in compar-
ison to other kinds of enhancement because of the
lack of agreement on what counts as ‘morally
better’ behavior [2].
There is currently no consensus on what moral
enhancement means exactly. Several proposals
have been made in the literature, expressing quite
different views of what moral enhancement is or
should be. Some definitions focus on moral behav-
ior or the outcomes of behavior, others on the
process of moral decision making, on human vir-
tues, on cognitive or affective capacities et cetera
[2]. The means that are suggested to reach moral
enhancement may also differ substantially. For ex-
ample, Persson and Savulescu [3] argue that there
is an urgent need to discover biological and ge-
netic means of moral enhancement, while others
argue that many useful ways of morally enhancing
individuals are already at our disposal. For in-
stance, John Harris [4] reminds us of various at-
tractive and effective examples of moral enhance-
ment that are readily available, tried and tested
(e.g., moral education), but have received little
attention in the moral enhancement literature.
New and emerging neuroscientific interventions
that are being tested and developed to treat dis-
eases, such as transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS), transcranial direct current stimulation
(tDCS), deep brain stimulation (DBS) or various
drugs, may have the potential to be used for moral
enhancement. Forms of neuromodulation - such as
TMS or DBS - that work directly on the brain, can
be contrasted with indirect means for moral en-
hancement such as education or therapy. The ques-
tion we want to answer is whether this difference
is morally relevant.
In this paper we will first discuss the nature of
moral decision-making and behavior, which in our
view involves cognitive, affective and motivational
processing, and the complex interplay between
these. We will discuss what we consider to be
moral enhancement and how different means may
be used to achieve it. Next, we will discuss wheth-
er the means we employ to reach moral enhance-
ment matter morally. Are certain means to achieve
moral enhancement wrong in themselves? Are cer-
tain means to achieve moral enhancement better
than others, and if so, why? More specifically,
we will investigate whether the difference between
direct and indirect moral enhancement matters
morally. We draw upon Neil Levy’s ‘parity princi-
ple’: BUnless we can identify ethically relevant
differences between internal and external interven-
tions and alterations, we ought to treat them on a
par.^ [5: 62]. Unlike for example Hank Greely,
who has stated that he sees Bno qualitative differ-
ence between acting directly to change a criminal’s
brain – through drugs, surgery, DBS, or vaccines,
if proven safe and effective – and acting indirectly
– through punishment, rehabilitation, cognitive
therapy, parole conditions – to achieve similar
ends^ [6: 1134], we will argue that there is a
relevant difference that warrants a different treat-
ment of different interventions.
We will argue, however, that the morally rele-
vant difference is not that between direct and
indirect interventions per se, but between what
we will call active and passive interventions. Ac-
tive interventions require specific psychological
and/or behavioral efforts on behalf of the
1 A questionnaire among the general public and GPs revealed both
groups are more reluctant towards the use of pharmaceuticals for
enhancement purposes if used for purely egoistic reasons com-
pared to socially related reasons [41]. Targeting morality may
therefore be more acceptable compared to other types of enhance-
ment due to inherent societal benefits if moral enhancement is
successful. On the other hand, because our moral characteristics
can be considered essential, deeply inherent traits of our person-
ality and self-identity, enhancing such traits in oneself and/or
others may be met with more reluctance compared to enhancing
cognitive traits such as attention or memory [13, 42]. Riis and
colleagues [42] found that out of 19 cognitive, emotional and
social traits, people were least willing to pharmaceutically enhance
the most morally significant traits included in the list (i.e., empathy
and kindness). Also, many individuals favored a ban on pharma-
ceutical enhancements of empathy and kindness in others (40 %
and 43 % respectively), although 7 other traits scored similar or
higher (e.g., math ability and wakefulness).
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individual to achieve the desired end, whereas
passive interventions bring about the desired end
‘by themselves’.2 Moreover, a continuum most
likely exists ranging from extremely passive to
extremely active interventions, with certain inter-
ventions lying somewhere in the middle (e.g.,
neurofeedback). Passive interventions may compro-
mise an individual’s autonomy and identity by
hijacking one’s ability to withdraw consent during
treatment and by causing drastic, abrupt and/or
concealed narrative identity changes. Whereas in-
direct interventions seem less likely to threaten our
autonomy and identity due to the active involve-
ment of the individual in question, direct
neuromodulation has the potential to be more
problematic in these respects. However, we argue
that this does not necessarily need to be the case
provided certain safeguards are put in place.
Although our paper focuses on moral enhance-
ment and the means that may be used to morally
enhance individuals, our arguments are also rele-
vant with regard to the more general debate on
biomedical means versus ‘natural’ means to treat
and/or enhance individuals.
The Nature and Neurobiology of Moral
Decision-Making and Behavior
In our view, moral enhancement refers to interventions
that aim to improve moral decision-making and behav-
ior. In order to understand what this implies, and how
this could be achieved, we first need to have an account
of how moral decision-making and moral behavior
‘work’.
Following Fischer and Ravizza’s [7] account of mor-
al responsibility, our capacity to be moral can be de-
scribed as the ability to recognize non-moral and moral
reasons and act upon these reasons. Their account draws
upon the capacities or abilities humans may or may not
(fully) possess in order to be considered morally respon-
sible. Hence, being moral requires, at the very least, that
an individual possesses these capacities or abilities to an
average or close to average degree. Fischer and Ravizza
[7] argue that the capacity for moral responsibility im-
plies that an individual has the ability for reason-respon-
sive behavior, comprising both a ‘receptivity to reasons’
and a ‘reactivity to reasons’. Receptivity to reasons
implies that the agent recognizes those reasons that are
captured by Bintuitively plausible conditions of
rationality^ [8: 97]. Reactivity to reasons involves the
capacity to translate reasons into choices and subsequent
behavior. According to Fischer and Ravizza [7], this
means that an individual has to have the capacity
or ‘cognitive power’ to recognize actual incentives
to do otherwise (e.g., that addiction disrupts one’s
connectedness with family and loved ones), and
has to display (some) reactivity to reasons in order
to show that she has the ‘executive power’ to react
to an actual incentive to do otherwise (e.g., if the
individual can abstain from her drug of choice if
the market price goes up). Fisher and Ravizza [7]
f u r t h e r a rgu e t h a t t h e k i nd o f r e a s on -
responsiveness that is required for moral responsi-
bility needs to be categorized as a responsiveness
to a range of reasons, including (some, but not
necessarily all) moral reasons. It is with this in
mind that Fischer and Ravizza [7] argue that some
psychopaths have diminished responsibility due to
a lack of responsiveness to moral reasons.
Although Fischer and Ravizza pay little attention to
the importance of affect with regard to the concept of
reasons-responsiveness, Bneuroscience research strong-
ly indicates that emotional reactivity is a necessary
2 We are aware of the fact that the term ‘passive’ in English
typically refers to ‘inactive’ or ‘inert’, which would imply that
passive interventions have no ability to change individuals, where-
as active interventions do have the ability to change individuals.
However, by ‘passive’ interventions we wish to refer to interven-
tions that can bring about changes without any psychological
involvement or effort on behalf of the individual, i.e., that make
the individual a passive recipient [27]. Active interventions are
then those interventions that need the psychological involvement
or effort of the individual in question to come about. Passive/active
thus refers to the involvement of the individual undergoing the
intervention, and not to the potential of the intervention itself to
bring about changes.
We use the terms direct/indirect similar to other authors in the
bioenhancement debate [e.g., [27, 30, 43–45]. For example,
Butblitz and Merkel [30] describe indirect interventions as inter-
ventions over which we have more control compared to direct
interventions. Indirect interventions are mediated by Binternal
processes on the part of the addressee^ [30: 69] whereas direct
interventions are not. Hence, on this definition indirect aligns with
active mental involvement on behalf of the individual, whereas
direct aligns with no involvement on behalf of the individual and
thus refers to changes that are passively brought about and can be
described as Bfreedom-subverting^ [44: 372]. To further clarify,
passive interventions might be described as ‘freedom incompati-
ble’ interventions, whereas active interventions might be described
as ‘freedom compatible’ interventions.
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process in the development of moral decision-
making^ [9: 53].3
According to recent neuroimaging studies, and in line
with developmental studies, moral reasoning draws up-
on a variety of neural networks, involving both affec-
tive, cognitive and motivational processes: BThe regions
recruited in moral cognition underlie specific states of
emotions, along with cognitive and motivational pro-
cesses, which emerge and interconnect over the course
of development to produce adaptive social behavior^ [9:
49, 10, 11]. As we mature, increased ‘communication’
(structural and functional integration) between these
networks takes place: BThus, what develops is not only
theory of mind but also the ability to integrate knowl-
edge about others’ thoughts with information about
consequences and emotions in the context of moral
judgment^ [9: 53]. Moreover, recent neuroscience re-
search has implicated the default mode network4 with
regard to our capacity to be moral: BIn our view, the
regulation of moral behavior involves intricate (mainly
frontal-temporal) brain systems supporting emotion pro-
cessing and goal-directed reasoning, in which the de-
fault mode network may act as a large-scale connection
contributing to integrate the emotional and cognitive
processes in moral dilemma situations^ [12: 918]. In
sum, an individual’s capacity to be moral (i.e., to recog-
nize and respond to non-moral and moral reasons) ap-
pears to draw upon affective, cognitive and motivational
processes that are neurologically and behaviorally
intertwined.
Defining Moral Enhancement
Based upon the above discussion of moral decision-
making and behavior, we tentatively suggest that moral
enhancement would require the strengthening and/or
instilling of ‘moral capacities’, that is: cognitive, affec-
tive and motivational capacities necessary for moral
decision making and behavior. When discussing moral
enhancement, the debate thus far has focused mainly on
‘isolated’ aspects of human thought and behavior such
as moral motives [13], (pro-social) emotions and moral
dispositions [14–16], ‘counter-moral emotions’ [13], or
moral rationality [4]. Emotions like fear can stimulate
immoral behavior, but may just as well attenuate im-
moral behavior depending on the situation and the indi-
vidual in question. Moral reasoning may lead to right
moral decisions but without themotivation to bemoral it
will not be conducive to moral behavior. For it to be
successful, moral enhancement will most likely require
a focus on all the aspects of normal moral decision-
making and behavior, and it will require interventions to
be tailored to the individual in question. We cannot
isolate ‘moral reasoning’ and think that it will be the
gateway to moral enhancement, and we cannot isolate
‘moral emotions’ and think those will do the trick. In
some individuals it might be enough to focus on either
emotions, reasons or motives provided that the others
aspects are functioning within the normal range, how-
ever, in many or even most others it will not. We have to
be fully aware of the fact that the human mind is not
made up of isolated capacities or traits. Although focus-
ing on moral virtues [17, 18] could potentially provide a
more holistic approach to moral enhancement, it may
lack a sufficient focus on the motivational processes
required for moral decision making and behavior. It
may also prove extremely difficult to relate general traits
such as specific ‘virtues’ (e.g., empathy) to neurobio-
logical and/or genetic correlates [19].
According to Harris ethical expertise is not Bbeing
better at being good^, but rather Bbeing better at know-
ing the good and understanding what is likely to con-
duce to the good^ [4:104]. We argue, however, that
moral enhancement should not exclusively entail the
instilment or the procurement of ethical expertise or
insight, but should equally be conducive to doing the
good.5 Similarly, moral enhancement should not merely
increase the likelihood of doing right or good actions
3 Based on the neurobiology and psychology of psychopathy, the
first author previously argued that both reasons-receptivity and
reasons-reactivity are to a greater or lesser degree impaired in
(some) psychopaths and that these impairments draw upon dys-
functional affective and cognitive processing [46]
4 The default mode brain network comprises a network of brain
regions that are active when an individual is at rest, depicting an
inward focus linked to introspection and self-referential thoughts
instead of an outward focus on the world around us
5 Although we agree with Harris that it is not necessarily so that
Bthose with the insight, sympathy, empathy, understanding and
knowledge to have formed clear ideas of what might conduce to
the good^ are better at Bdoing good in any of the ways in which
this is possible^ [4: 104], it cannot but raise the odds substantially
that these individuals will do good. If not, this would entail that
insight, sympathy, empathy, understanding and knowledge are not
essential building blocks of what it means to be a good person. Of
course circumstances can still tilt the individual towards wrong-
doing, but under the right circumstances, the odds of behaving in a
morally good way are raised substantially.
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and decrease the likelihood of doing wrong or bad
actions without any corresponding change in moral
reasoning or emotion. We do not consider this sufficient
to speak of moral enhancement. Increased right or good
actions need to be accompanied by an individual’s un-
derstanding of what constitutes right and wrong actions,
and thus by responsiveness to moral reasons, to consider
certain interventions moral enhancements. Moreover,
such a requirement enables the kind of moral enhance-
ment that will likely be long-term and stable, i.e., able to
resist all sorts of potential pitfalls of a kind of technology
that exclusively targets behavioral outcomes and not the
process of morality itself.
Although, for example, inducing a heightened capac-
ity for fear in psychopaths may lead to an increase in the
likelihood of these individuals doing right or good ac-
tions, it may not lead to an increase in their understand-
ing of what constitutes right and wrong actions. Where-
as interventions that increase fear in psychopaths may
therefore be beneficial from a societal perspective and
ethically defensible in their own right, such interven-
tions do not amount to moral enhancements if they do
not similarly induce an increased understanding of mo-
rality (i.e., responsiveness to moral reasons). Such inter-
ventions should be characterized as forms of behavior
control, rather than as moral enhancement. In compari-
son, an individual with antisocial personality traits may
possess (sufficient) understanding of what constitutes
right and wrong, but at the same time may be unable
to do good or right actions due to impairments in im-
pulsivity and/or attention. Diminishing impulsivity and
restoring or enhancing attention in these individuals
may lead to an increase in the likelihood of these indi-
viduals doing right or good actions that are based on a
sufficiently proper understanding of moral reasons. This
may indeed be described as a moral enhancement. Sim-
ilarly, increasing certain moral dispositions such as em-
pathy in normal individuals, or increasing their reason-
ing skills, may lead to moral enhancement because
normal individuals already posses some (more or less
adequate) level of understanding of morality (i.e., re-
sponsiveness to moral reasons). Although certain out-
come oriented interventions may achieve an increased
likelihood of good actions (or decrease the likelihood of
wrong ones), and may therefore be ethically defensible
in themselves, we argue that moral enhancement should
involve responsiveness to moral reasons. If such under-
standing is absent, the intervention should be under-
stood as a form of behavior control.
How to Attain Moral Enhancement?
With regard to morally enhancing individuals that have
‘normally’ functioning morality6 - that is: average or
close to average cognitive, affective and motivational
capacities - the approach that is suggested by Harris will
most likely be a good route to take: B… a combination
of rationality and education, possibly assisted by various
other forms of cognitive enhancement, in addition to
courses or sources of education and logic^ [4: 105]. This
should likely be complemented with approaches that
strengthen affective and motivational aspects of moral-
ity, as Harris implicitly acknowledgeswhen he describes
our traditional methods of moral development and en-
hancement, as Bbringing children up to know the differ-
ence between right and wrong, to avoid inflicting pain or
suffering on or doing harm to others; and instilling in
them habits of respect for others^ [4: 104]. Harris de-
scribes these as modes of respect that include Baltruism,
sensitivity and consideration and perhaps above all of
being able to put ourselves in others’ shoes so that we
not only understand, but imaginatively experience, what
it might be like to be on the receiving end of the conduct
of others^ [4: 104]. Although Harris is right that these
traditional methods have been tried and tested, and have
been shown to work in the average person, these methods
will not be effective for everyone. For example, children
with callous-unemotional traits or with severe ADHD, or
other moderate to severe neurodevelopmental problems,
may not be able to develop the necessary capacities even
when vigorously stimulated (in traditional ways) to do so.
It is likely that traditional approaches will not suffice
to effectively enhance morality in individuals that do not
exhibit close to average or average cognitive, affective,
motivational capacities.7 Enhancing morality cannot be
achieved with a one-size-fits-all strategy and it will need
6 How we can and should differentiate between normal and ab-
normal moral capacities or moral functioning, or how we can
distinguish between average, or above- or below-average is a
complex normative and empirical question. Answering these ques-
tions would require a separate paper. Yet another question is which
means would be imaginable to increase moral capacities far above
normal or average moral capacities, i.e., enhance morality beyond
human norms [47]. We will not concerns ourselves with that latter
question here.
7 In cases where pathological deficiencies in moral capacities are
present, we might speak of moral therapy or repair, rather than
enhancement. Although the treatment-enhancement distinction
has been much discussed and criticized, we believe that if under-
stood as a merely descriptive distinction, it can help to clarify the
discussion.
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to be tailored to the specific individual in question. In
individuals for whom traditional means do not work,
more direct forms of biological intervention – biomedical
moral enhancement [13] or moral bioenhancement [16] –
have been suggested. Such biomedical interventions can
range from vitamin and fish oil supplements, to medica-
tion and non-invasive magnetic brain stimulation, to more
invasive and risky interventions like electrical deep brain
stimulation. For example, a wide variety of medications,
for example SSRIs and antipsychotics, can be successful
in lowering impulsivity and aggression in adults and
children [20, 21] and neurofeedback is being investigated
tomanage risk factors for deviant, immoral behavior, such
as ADHD [22] and substance use disorders [23, 24]. Also,
more recently, small-scale investigational studies involv-
ing non-invasive neurostimulation such as tDCS and
TMS seem to show some promise for the management
of addictions (17 studies, medium effect size). Magnetic
stimulation that targets the prefrontal cortex may increase
cognitive control mechanisms, decrease craving levels, or
both [25, 26]. However, it must be kept in mind that right
now, most of these interventions are in the early stages of
research and development, and may or may not turn out
to be effective approaches towards moral enhancement
in the long run.
Do Means Matter: Direct vs Indirect and Active vs
Passive Moral Enhancement
Even if the biomedical means for moral enhancement are
still mainly hypothetical, we should consider whether the
(further) development of such means is morally accept-
able and desirable. Means to attain moral enhancement
can be separated in indirect and direct interventions:
indirect interventions aim to change thought patterns
and behavior and thus rewire an individual’s brain struc-
ture and functioning, whereas direct interventions aim to
change brain structure and function and thereby an indi-
vidual’s thought patterns and behavior. Indirect (targeting
the mind) and direct (targeting the brain) moral enhance-
ment are different ways of achieving the same end, i.e.,
moral betterment. Most ‘traditional’means to attain mor-
al enhancement, such as education, are indirect in this
sense, while biomedical moral enhancements tend to be
direct. It is important to keep in mind, however, that
changing either brain or mind inevitably involves chang-
ing both. Indirect interventions such as talk therapy, as
well as direct interventions such as DBS, target the brain’s
capacity for reorganization to exert their effects, and one
could argue that the results are, in the end, the same. Talk
therapy uses our brain’s capacity for reorganization by
directly influencing mental states and thus indirectly the
brain states underlying our mental states, whereas DBS
uses our brain’s capacity for reorganization by directly
influencing brain states and thus indirectly the mental
states that result from this direct ‘rewiring’ of the brain.
Neurofeedback can be seen as an intermediary.
Neurofeedback targets an individual’s mental states while
linking these mental states to specific brain activation
patterns.8 However, the brain activation patterns are
changed in a more direct way as compared to talk therapy
– because the individual chooses to reiterate certain
thoughts/mental states in order to achieve the desired
brain activation patterns. So neurofeedback could be seen
as targeting both mental states and brain states in a direct
way, or at least more direct/less indirect as compared to
talk therapy.
Intuitively it seems that indirect means are more in
tune with the nature of moral decision-making and
behavior9 and the importance that is typically placed
on freedom within the realm of moral decisions and
acts.10 Although both direct and indirect moral
8 During neurofeedback training, feedback of neural metabolic
activity is brought to the attention of the participant by the use of
an interactive graphic display with the aim of conditioning area
specific brain processes. Several fMRI neurofeedback studies have
demonstrated that humans can learn to self-regulate localized brain
regions, including emotional brain regions, based on a combina-
tion of contingent feedback and mental strategies [48].
9 As outlined above in section 3–5: The interconnectedness of
emotions, reasons and motives in normal moral decision-making
and behavior, both from a neurobiological and experiential
perspective.
10 See the discussion on ‘freedom to fall’ within the moral en-
hancement debate [4, 13, 19, 43, 49–51; and others]. According to
Persson & Savulescu [3], Harris fears that moral bioenhancement
will Bmake the freedom to do immoral things impossible, rather
than simply make the doing of them wrong and giving us moral,
legal and prudential reasons to refrain^ [4: 105]. Which basically
entails that he fears that we will no longer act for reasons, but will
become Bmindless robots^ [3: 128]. One may argue that moral
enhancement, to be successful, should render an individual’s rea-
sons and/or motives for doing good more salient, and make these
play a (more) salient role in one’s decision-making processes, but
should not make individuals Bmindless robots^. Doing good
should still remain an option, a behavior of choice, among the
many options that individuals may have. Moral enhancement
should therefore not curtail our ‘freedom to behave immoral’,
but if successful, it will make immoral behavior less likely by,
for example, making it easier to resist certain counter-moral in-
centives. It should provide a way to make Bthe unacceptable
unpalatable^, not undoable [52: 170].
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enhancement may be effective, moral intuition may
favor more traditional, indirect means, over direct bio-
medical ones to achieve moral betterment. Is this intui-
tion sustainable? Does it matter morally whether mental
states and/or brain states are targeted directly or indi-
rectly? An obvious reply is that it matters with regard to
potential risks and side effects, which may be bigger
with direct brain interventions - but does it matter in any
other morally relevant way?
We believe that the distinction between direct and
indirect interventions tracks an underlying distinction
between interventions that require active involvement
and effort of the person in question, and those that allow
for the subject to remain a ‘passive recipient’ [27, 28].
This is a morally relevant distinction, since – as we will
argue below - passive interventions have a greater po-
tential to compromise autonomy and identity. Hence, we
argue that the distinction between direct and indirect is
morally relevant insofar as it relates to the distinction
between passive and active.
When we travel alongside the continuum from indi-
rect to direct interventions, we are also travelling along-
side interventions that (potentially) leave less and less
room for active psychological and behavioral involve-
ment in the changes that are induced, and less and less
room for rational reflection and deliberation upon those
changes. The more direct an intervention becomes, the
more passive the individual that is receiving it will be
with respect to the changes that are induced. For exam-
ple, successful DBS for tremor in Parkinson’s disease
does not require any effort on behalf of the patient to
reach its goal. Of course, it requires active involvement
and effort to undergo surgery and battery replacements,
to deal with any side effects should these occur, and to
adjust to the new situation. However, it does not require
any effort on behalf of the patient to stop the tremor – the
device and the electrical stimulation do this ‘all by
themselves’. A similar ‘passive receiver’ set-up is in-
volved in TMS or tDCS. Neurofeedback, which is less
passive compared to deep brain stimulation or non-
invasive magnetic brain stimulation, requires the execu-
tion of a specific computer task tailored to the needs of
the individual in order for the training to work. Cogni-
tive behavioral therapy, which is an active process by
nature, depends to a large extent on the mental effort of
the individual during therapy, as well as in consciously
applying therapist suggested mental strategies on a day
to day basis. Moral education and learning can be de-
scribed as an active process of trial and error involving
personal experience and psychological effort to
exert its effects.
Passive interventions such as DBS and TMS or tDCS
do not rely on the active involvement of the receiver to
achieve their goal, and therefore carry a substantial risk
of bypassing conscious reflection, continuous rational
deliberation and autonomous choice. This may compro-
mise both autonomy and identity, as we will discuss in
the next sections.
Limiting Continued Rational Deliberation
and Autonomous Choice
Being autonomous means leading one’s life in accor-
dance with one’s own choices, that is, choices that are
based on the values and goals we endorse after deliber-
ation. Part of being an autonomous individual involves
having the freedom and ability to withdraw from inter-
ventions or treatments that we no longer rationally en-
dorse. This means that after giving one’s informed con-
sent, it remains possible to withdraw from the interven-
tion or treatment at any given time. For example, an
individual with advance-stage cancer may rationally opt
to undergo aggressive chemo therapy even though the
chances of being cured are extremely slim, but that same
individual after consenting to treatment may also ratio-
nally opt to withdraw from treatment even if she thus
faces death. Depending on whether active or passive
means of moral enhancement are used, an individual’s
freedom to withdraw from the intervention may be more
threatened or compromised. Passive enhancement may
even be applied without consent from the subject, since
it does not depend on active participation or involve-
ment for its success.
An individual undergoing cognitive behavioral ther-
apy – an active intervention – for her anger management
and impulse control problems may feel that the ways in
which she is changing is either worthwhile, because it
helps her to stay out of trouble and lead a more regular
life, or she may feel that it threatens what she finds
important in life, like being spontaneous or living on
the edge. Because cognitive behavioral therapy takes a
lot of active participation of the individual, and because
it is a gradual process for which the success depends to a
large part on the active participation and effort of the
individual, ample room is left for the individual to
rationally reflect upon the changes that are brought
about as the intervention continues and to withdraw
from the intervention if one cannot identify with these
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changes, or to reject certain changes and endorse others.
By contrast, when directly altering an individual’s brain
functioning, subsequent changes to ones identity cannot
be deliberated on in the same gradual manner and can-
not be selectively endorsed or rejected. Direct moral
enhancement, more so than indirect moral enhancement
like education, therefore carries the risk or even threat of
Bcoercive normalization^ [29: 672] or coercive change,
especially if given to children by their parents or offered
to criminals as an alternative sanction. Recently Bublitz
and Merkel [30], in concordance with our approach,
argued that individuals have a right to mental self-
determination and that there are limits to the ways in
which we may legitimately change mental states in
others. Respect for ‘mental integrity’ is voiced in Art.
3 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and falls
under the scope of Art. 8 of the European Convention of
Human Rights. We agree with Bublitz and Merkel [30]
that respect for persons entails respect for an individual’s
first-person perspective and entails prohibitions on di-
rect interventions without consent. Nevertheless – and
we agree with this point as well – they claim that, within
certain limits, direct interventions can be justified if a
informed consent is given.
Threats to Identity
Interventions aimed at moral enhancement have the
potential to threaten a person’s narrative identity [31,
32]. According to Schechtman [33], narrative identity
reflects the characteristics that constitute a person’s
identity. Put simply, the characterization question asks
Bwhich actions, experiences, beliefs, values, desires,
character traits, and so on … are to be attributed to a
given person^ [33: 73]. According to DeGrazia narra-
tive identity involves Bwhat is most central and salient in
a given person’s self-conception^ [31: 266]. Narrative
identity is thus in line with recent notions of personality
in psychology and psychiatry, in which personality is
defined as Ba dynamic and organized set of characteris-
tics in a person that uniquely influences his or her
cognitions, motivations, and behaviors in various
situations^ [34: 4], rather than a fixed set of psycholog-
ical traits that define the true self [35, 36]. Central to a
narrative view of identity is the fact that identity is
understood in the Bdynamics of psychological change^
[36:137], meaning that an individual’s beliefs, desires,
personality traits and so on may change over time.
However, it is important for the continuity of narrative
identity that such changes are or can be incorporated in
one’s life story in a coherent way, without compromis-
ing one’s sense of self.
Identity changes can either be in tune with one’s
narrative self-concept or be experienced as disruptive
of one’s narrative. If disruptive, it means that the chang-
es do not align (well) with the individual’s actions,
experiences, beliefs, values, desires and character traits
that are constitutive of her identity.
Radical and/or Abrupt Narrative Identity Changes
While interventions aimed at moral enhancement will
inevitably influence one’s narrative identity – since it is
their purpose to change one into a more moral person –
they may do so in different ways. Mild or moderate
identity changes due to indirect (e.g., therapy, exercise)
or direct interventions (e.g., SSRIs, non-invasive mag-
netic brain stimulation, DBS) are not necessarily prob-
lematic. Mild and moderate identity changes are a nor-
mal part of the way in which life unfolds and may result
from a variety of life-changing experiences or circum-
stances. For example, becoming a parent may change an
individual from being somewhat irresponsible to be-
coming responsible. The loss of a loved onemay change
someone from being optimistic and cheerful, to being
overly cautious, sad and depressed. However, direct,
passive interventions like DBS may induce such radical
and/or abrupt changes, with little or no link to an indi-
vidual’s narrative life story, that the continuity of one’s
narrative identity may be threatened.
Schechtman [36] has discussed whether radical and/
or abrupt psychological changes due to DBS – a passive
intervention - interfere with our identity in an ethically
objectionable way. DBS patients express post-operative
difficulties adjusting to psychological changes and
changes in functional status, as well as to adopting a
new self-image [37]. Also, some patients report difficul-
ty to accept the presence of an electronic device in their
brain, as if they were now a robot or electronic puppet,
alienated from their own narrative [36, 38]. Some indi-
viduals may experience such acute and dramatic chang-
es in their psychological make-up that it frightens them,
and leaves them feeling alienated and without a sense of
control and/or agency. Schechtman gives an example of
a depressed person: BThe psychological changes
brought about are so profound and occur so quickly that
they can seem to break off one narrative – the story of a
depressed person – and start a new one – that of a happy
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person^ [36: 137]. One could image, however, similar
difficulties if a former psychopath was suddenly turned
into a empathic, warm person; if an aggressive and
short-tempered man suddenly turned into a soft and
easy-going one; or if a goal-seeking, dynamic women
turned into a disinterested individual that completely
lost her drive and vitality.
Although radical and/or abrupt changes may indeed
be disrupting to one’s identity, this need not necessarily
be the case, and it need not render the intervention
unethical. An individual may experience, or regain, a
continuity of her narrative identity, even despite radical
change, if such changes are properly understood, antic-
ipated and supported. If the individual, through pre- and
post-intervention guidance and counselling, can foresee
and properly understand the potential for psycho-
logical changes, these changes can be incorporated
in one’s narrative self-concept in a coherent man-
ner and may be experienced as self-directed and
even self-expressive. We agree with Schechtman
that psychological changes, even dramatic ones,
can indeed be coherently incorporated in one’s life
story if such safeguards are put in place. This
means that proper informed consent procedures
and pre- and post-intervention-counselling are es-
sential requirements for an ethical application of
passive forms of moral enhancement. Subjects
should be enabled to actively incorporate the pas-
sively induced changes in their narrative identity.
‘Concealed’ Narrative Identity Changes
There is another way, however, in which one’s narrative
identity may be disrupted by direct interventions like
DBS, that we consider to be more problematic from an
ethical perspective. DBS may result in narrative identity
changes that go (partially) unnoticed (e.g., very mild or
subtle changes that may have more serious long-term
effects on personal relations) or are denied (e.g., in-
stances where the magnitude of the changes or the
consequences thereof are underestimated) by the indi-
vidual in question, although they are noticed by the
family, loved ones or co-workers. For example, Leentjes
and colleagues [39] describe a case study of an individ-
ual with Parkinson’s disease who became euphoric and
disinhibited after DBS surgery. The 62-year old man
entered a relationship with a married women and started
spending huge amounts of his savings on clothing and
partying. His disinbition and megalomania gradually
worsened into a manic disorder. He bought several
houses by taking up several mortgages. He bought a
few new cars, got into car accidents and temporarily lost
his driver’s license. While the stimulation was turned on
the man displayed impaired judgment and a total denial
of his changed personality and psychiatric symptoms.
When the stimulation was turned off his motor symp-
toms returned, but he did admit to having psychiatric
symptoms and impaired judgment while the stimulation
was turned on. In several individuals receiving DBS
treatment, not readily apparent, mild forms of irritability,
impatience and distractions on behalf of the patient, put
strain on existing relationships, aggravate preexisting
marital problems and frequently lead to familial con-
flicts and adjustment problems at work [38].
One important element regarding narrative identity is
that it can be assessed both from a first-person and third-
person perspective. One such example of the third-
person perspective is Bthe startled BWho are you?^ we
can imagine coming from Ted Bundy’s fiancée when
she discovers that the personable law student with
whom she meant to spend her life is a serial killer^
[33: 75], but there are of course much less extreme cases
such as when finding out that your partner, who you
thought was committed, is having an affair. In contrast,
the first person-perspective draws upon an individual’s
own assessment of the narrative identity changes that
she experience throughout life. To be sufficiently aware
of one’s narrative identity, a narrator must be able to
coherently ‘explain’ or communicate the narrative
unfolding of her life story.
Schechtman [33] argues that individuals may experi-
ence ‘self-blindness’ at times and describes this as cases
in which an individual’s explicit self-narrative diverges
from her implicit self-narrative. This implicit self-
narrative can be understood as Bthe psychological orga-
nization from which experience and actions are actually
flowing^, reflecting Ba dynamic set of organizing prin-
ciples, a basic orientation through which, with or with-
out conscious awareness, an individual understands
himself and his world^ [33: 115–116].
Direct interventions aimed at moral enhance-
ment may involve psychological changes in this
set of organizing principles that go (partially) un-
noticed by the individual in question and thus are
perceived as part of her pre-enhanced identity, or
may involve changes that are underestimated or
even denied. Although direct interventions like
DBS may evoke feelings of alienation in some
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patients, it is equally possible that they result in
the unreflective self-incorporation or underestima-
tion of certain new traits. This unreflective self-
incorporation or underestimation may be due to
the directness of the technique11 which leaves the
person a passive recipient of these changes, rather
than an active agent. This might lead individuals
to unreflectively accept or even welcome certain
traits that would not be similarly endorsed by their
pre-interventional/pre-enhanced self. Because these
changes occur (partially) unnoticed, one’s capacity
to rationally deliberate on and reflectively endorse
or resist these changes is removed. It may there-
fore result in a dissociation between one’s implicit
narrative self and one’s explicit narrative self, that
means: in a situation of self-blindness. While such
a dissociation is clearly problematic as it has the
potential to disrupt one’s personal and professional
relations, it is also problematic from an intrinsic
perspective because self-blindness, in this sense, is
a form of inauthenticity that threatens the autono-
my of the self.
In line with DeGrazia’s theory of personal narrative
identity [31], we claim that in order for identity changes
to result in an autonomous self, in an authentic narrative
identity, an individual must be able to reflectively and
deliberatively approve or disapprove of the changes that
occur during her life. Following DeGrazia, whether new
traits, preferences or values that a person acquires be-
come a true part of the person’s explicit and autonomous
narrative identity, depends on two things: whether the
person identifies with his new traits or desires; and
whether she identifies with their genesis, i.e., the way
they came about [28]. This requires, first of all, that he
individual has to be aware of these changes. Changes
that go unnoticed or are denied, like concealed narrative
identity changes, thus pose a threat to one’s autonomy
and identity.
In order to minimize this threat of concealed
changes to ones autonomy and identity, we pro-
pose a number of measures. First, the individual
should be prospectively informed about the possi-
bility and nature of potential narrative identity
changes, and the fact that some of these changes
may go unnoticed by herself but will be noticeable
to others. This should be part of the informed
consent procedure for direct interventions.
Second, persons undergoing a direct interven-
tion like DBS should be maximally enabled to
reflect on these changes and to choose to endorse
or reject them; this should be part of the post-
intervention counseling. For concealed changes,
this means they should be brought to the person’s
attention and discussed with her as much as pos-
sible, in order to enable her to reflect on them and
integrate them in her personal narrative. Not all
concealed changes need to remain concealed. Self-
blindness need not be permanent and unintended
changes in the self can become an authentic part
of one’s narrative identity over time if one reflec-
tively endorses these changes. This implies that
direct, passive means for moral enhancement must
be accompanied by supportive interventions that
actively involve the enhanced person herself.
The primary responsibility for ensuring informed
consent as well as for providing adequate pre- and
post-intervention counselling would lie with the treat-
ment team (e.g., expert medical team or licensed psy-
chologist). As with any medical intervention – and we
believe an invasive intervention in the brain should be
considered as such – the treating physician or psychol-
ogist is responsible for ensuring the quality of care.12
Treatments consisting of direct interventions in the brain
should be considered as a ‘global treatment’; it does not
only focus on the brain but on the whole person in
interaction with his environment [40]. The treatment
consist not only of the actual operation, but includes
the fine-tuning of the electric parameters as well as the11 Because direct neuromodulation affects the entire brain (by
directly stimulating part of a network in the brain that interacts
with other areas and networks in the brain) subsequent psycholog-
ical and personality changes may either go unnoticed by the
individual in question and leave the individual without any means
to reflect upon, or rationally endorse, her changed identity, or may
lead one to unreflectively accept or welcome certain traits. If we
take into account the way our brain works it is not unlikely that
directly changing an individual’s moral dispositions (e.g., empa-
thy, sense of justice, sense of fairness) will affect one’s entire belief
system, i.e., in such a way that the individual in question does not
necessarily experience a discontinuity as such.
12 We are aware that some interventions, such as transcranial direct
current stimulation (tDCS), can currently be applied on a do-it-
yourself basis, hence without a responsible medical practitioner in
charge. For reasons of patient safety and well-being, we would
recommend that such interventions are regulated by legal mea-
sures for product safety and personal use (e.g., licenses for per-
sonal use involving training sessions with skilled experts) in the
short-term while undergoing regulation by the Medical Devices
Directive (MDD) in the long term [53].
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necessary psycho-social support.13 With regard to the
question of financial responsibility, we believe this
would depend on the context. Different countries have
different insurance regimes for covering medical costs,
people might choose to enhance themselves at their own
expenses or, if moral enhancement would be used in the
context of a criminal justice system, costs might be
covered by the budget of the Justice Department or
Health Department.
Conclusion
If we as a society and as individuals want to contribute
to a morally better world in which public and personal
well-being are valued and pursued, moral enhancement
is an important option to consider. Moral enhancement
entails, we have argued, strengthening or instilling cog-
nitive, affective and motivational capacities necessary
for moral decision making and behavior, in a way that
makes - or leaves - people responsive to moral reasons.
In individuals with normal capacities for moral
decision-making and behavior, moral enhancement can
likely be achieved through traditional, indirect means
such as moral education and social learning. However,
in individuals with impairments in moral decision-
making and behavior or counter-moral personality traits,
such means might not suffice to achieve moral better-
ment and biomedical, directmeans come into focus as a
potential – although presently largely hypothetical –
solution. Moral intuition seems to favor indirect means
over direct means as direct means often raise worries
and uncertainties considering their potential for harm
due to side effects, risks and abuse, as well as intrinsic
doubts concerning authenticity and autonomy.
Is it the case that indirect means are morally prefer-
able to direct means of moral enhancement and can we
indeed pinpoint relevant intrinsic, moral differences be-
tween both?We argue that the distinction between direct
and indirect means is indeed morally relevant, but only
insofar as it tracks an underlying distinction between
active and passive interventions. Although passive in-
terventions can be ethical provided specific safeguards
are put in place, these interventions exhibit a greater
potential to compromise autonomy and disrupt identity.
First, direct, passive interventions limit an individual’s
capacity for continued rational deliberation and autono-
mous choice. When directly altering an individual’s
brain functioning, psychological changes cannot be de-
liberated on in the same gradual manner and cannot be
similarly selectively endorsed or rejected as is the case
in indirect, active interventions. The gradual nature of
the enhancement process in active interventions does, in
general, allow for rational deliberation and autonomous
choice as the intervention continues, and one can easily
put a stop to further changes by discontinuing the inter-
vention. Second, direct, passive interventions may in-
duce such radical and/or abrupt psychological changes,
with little or no link to an individual’s narrative life
story, that the continuity of one’s narrative identity is
threatened. However, such psychological changes, even
radical ones, can be coherently incorporated in one’s life
story provided that proper informed consent procedures
and pre- and post-intervention-counseling are put in
place. Third, the possibility of concealed narrative iden-
tity changes, changes that, to a lesser or greater extent,
go unnoticed or are denied by the individual undergoing
the treatment may result in a situation of self-blindness.
Self-blindness can be construed as a form of inauthen-
ticity that threatens the autonomy of the self because one
obviously cannot reflectively and deliberatively approve
or disapprove of such implicit, unrecognized psycho-
logical changes. Prospectively informing individuals
about the possibility and nature of such changes and
post-intervention counseling can aid individuals in over-
coming instances of psychological self-blindness and in
learning to cope with disrupted social-emotional
relations.
In sum, direct biomedical moral enhancements can
be ethically acceptable if such interventions are volun-
tary, and if, as outlined above, specific conditions to
safeguard autonomy and identity are met. This means
13 An important question that links to these issues is whether
enhanced individuals themselves should take responsibility for
unwanted adverse behavioral effects. This question is not unique
to the moral enhancement debate and similar problems have
arising within various other treatment settings (e.g., medications
for psychiatric disorders, DBS for movement disorders, psycho-
surgery). For example, following a cingulotomy for treatment-
refractory obsessive compulsive behavior, patients may exhibit
clinical disinhibition. Cases are known of such patients commit-
ting sexual offences post-operatively. Can we hold such individ-
uals (fully) responsible for their deviant behavior? Similarly, are
technologically enhanced individuals responsible for any unex-
pected adverse effects that may arise? For example, think of the
use of moral bioenhancement within criminal justice settings,
should we hold the criminal justice system or the offender respon-
sible for adverse, unwanted behavioral effects, or both? [see, e.g.,
45, 54, 55]
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that passive interventions ought to be accompanied by
supportive interventions that actively involve the subject
of the intervention. In general, passive interventions
aimed at moral enhancement should be treated especial-
ly cautious compared to active interventions both with
respect to their overall moral acceptability and with
respect to their potential use within the criminal justice
and public health domain.
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